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RISKY BUSINESS: DIRECTORS MAKING BUSINESS
JUDGMENTS IN WASHINGTON STATE
Adam J. Richins
Abstract: Section 23B.08.300 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) defines the
general standards of conduct for directors in discharging corporate duties. The Washington
State Legislature developed these standards to govern the manner in which directors perform
their duties, rather than to impose liability on directors for negligent business decisions under
the business judgment rule. Indeed, the business judgment rule, as defined by leading
corporate-law jurisdictions and the American Bar Association, generally protects directors
from liability associated with negligent business decisions so long as the director makes
decisions in good faith, on an informed basis, without self-interest, and in accordance with
the director's belief of what is best for the corporation. Nevertheless, the Washington State
Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the ordinary due-care standard of conduct included
in RCW 23B.08.300 is an element of the business judgment rule standard of liability. Under
the court's interpretation of the business judgment rule, the quality or substance of a
director's business decision will not be protected from liability unless an ordinarily prudent
person would have made the same decision under like circumstances. This Comment first
argues that the standards of conduct set forth in RCW 23B.08.300 are separate and distinct
from the business judgment rule standard of liability, and should not impose liability on
directors for unfavorable business decisions. Second, this Comment proposes a legal
framework for applying the business judgment rule in Washington state that is consistent
with court precedent and the legislative intent underlying RCW 23B.08.300. Finally, this
Comment proposes that Washington state courts adopt section 8.31 of the Model Business
Corporations Act to provide the judiciary, directors, and the corporate bar with additional
guidance in applying the business judgment rule.
State statutes generally provide that the business and affairs of a
corporation must be managed under the direction of a board of
directors.1 Directors commonly authorize major corporate actions,
counsel officers, oversee auditing procedures, and supervise ongoing
investments of the corporation.2 Although directorial management does
not require directors to engage in the daily handling of a company's
business, 3 they may be responsible for making business judgments as
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2004) (stating that the business and affairs of a
corporation in Delaware must be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2005) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.010 (2004) (same).
2. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02
(1994) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
3. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) ("Directorial
management does not require a detailed inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a general
monitoring of corporate affairs and policies.").
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part of their directorial functions.4
The pace and complexity of the modem business world places
directors in an environment of risk.5 Business imperatives often call for
quick decisions based on imperfect information.6 Even the most rational
decision at the time may seem like a "wild hunch" when a court reviews
it years later in the light of perfect knowledge.7 Courts recognize that the
standard they use to review a director's decision should reflect this
imperfect business environment. In addition, courts have acknowledged
that directors are usually more qualified to make business decisions than
judges.9 As a result, courts typically give substantial deference to
directors' business decisions.10 The business judgment rule embodies
this deference. 11
The business judgment rule is a common-law standard of judicial
review designed to protect directors from the inherent risks of their
position. 12 In general, the rule shields a director from liability for a
business decision when the director: (1) acts in good faith; (2) is not self-
interested; (3) becomes informed, prior to making a decision, to the
extent the director reasonably believes appropriate under the
circumstances; and (4) having become informed, acts according to his or
her reasonable beliefe3 of what is best for a corporation at the time. 14
4. See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 2.01 (7th ed. 2004).
5. See JENNIFER L. BERGER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1037, at 42 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002).
6. See id. at 44.
7. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[A director's] function is to
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a
wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge.").
8. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, § 2.02.
9. See, e.g., Int'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The business
judgment rule is a policy of judicial restraint born of the recognition that directors are, in most
cases, more qualified to make business decisions than are judges.").
10. E. Norman Veasey, New Insights Into Judicial Deference to Directors' Business Decisions.
Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 BuS. LAW. 1461, 1463 (1984).
11. Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
12. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-55 (2002); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 2, § 4.01(c) cmt. b.
13. The comments for § 8.31 of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) state that the term
"reasonable belief' calls for a subjective belief, except in the "rare case where a decision respecting
the corporation's best interests is so removed from the realm of reason (e.g. corporate waste) ... as
to fall outside permissible bounds of sound discretion." MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-
63 to -64 (emphasis added).
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Importantly, the rule applies only where directors make conscious
business decisions.15 The rule does not shield directors in cases of
"omission," where an injury to a corporation or its shareholders resulted
from a director's inattentiveness rather than a decision to take or not to
take action. 16
Washington courts have applied the business judgment rule for over
thirty years, 17 but have not interpreted the rule consistently. 18 Many
inconsistencies in application originate from ambiguities within section
23B.08.300 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). 19 RCW
23B.08.300 defines the general standards of conduct for directors in
discharging corporate duties. 20 The statute is ambiguous because it does
not clearly spell out whether liability will result from a violation of its
standards of director conduct.2' The statute is also ambiguous because it
does not indicate whether it applies to directors' decisions in addition to
general oversight duties.22 These ambiguities raise the question of
whether the legislature intended to modify Washington's common-law
application of the business judgment rule.23 However, the statute's
14. Id. § 8.31 ("A director shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders for any
decision to take or not to take action... unless the party asserting liability in a proceeding
establishes that: ... (2) the challenged conduct consisted or was the result of: (i) action not in good
faith; or (ii) a decision (A) which the director did not reasonably believe to be in the best interests of
the corporation, or (B) as to which the director was not informed to an extent the director reasonably
believed appropriate in the circumstances."); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c)
("A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty under this
Section if the director or officer: (1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judgment; (2)
is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or officer
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the
business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.").
15. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c) cmt. c. The business judgment rule also
applies when a director makes a decision not to act. Id.
16. See id.; In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 1875804, at
*32 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
17. See Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 631-33, 934 P.2d 669, 680-81 (1997); Nursing Home
Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wash. App. 489,498-99, 535 P.2d 137, 143-44 (1975).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (2004).
20. See id.
21. See id. § 23B.08.300(4).
22. See id. § 23B.08.300(l).
23. See R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability: The
Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 Bus. LAW. 35, 40 (2000) (discussing how similar text
in a 1974 Amendment to the MBCA raised questions regarding whether the American Bar
Association (ABA) intended to preempt common-law application of the business judgment rule).
979
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legislative history shows that the legislature intended RCW 23B.08.300
to be separate and distinct from the business judgment rule, and not to
introduce a new source of liability for a director's business decision.24
Nonetheless, in two separate cases, the Washington State Supreme Court
has suggested that RCW 23B.08.300 is part of the business judgment
rule.25
This Comment argues that Washington courts should not incorporate
RCW 23B.08.300's ordinarily prudent person standard into the business
judgment rule's standard of liability. Instead, courts should recognize the
business judgment rule as a limitation on director liability that is distinct
from RCW 23B.08.300's standard of conduct, in accord with the
statute's legislative history and lower court precedent. Part I of this
Comment defines the business judgment rule as commonly recognized
in leading corporate-law jurisdictions throughout the United States. Part
II analyzes RCW 23B.08.300 and its extensive legislative history. Part
III evaluates Washington state's common-law development of the
business judgment rule. Part IV posits two arguments regarding
interpretation and application of the business judgment rule in
Washington. Part IV.A argues that the standards of conduct contained in
RCW 23B.08.300 do not establish the standard for liability under which
business judgments are reviewed. Part IV.B outlines how Washington
state courts should apply the business judgment rule. Finally, Part V
concludes that courts should incorporate section 8.31 of the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA) into Washington's business
judgment rule to provide the judiciary, directors, and the corporate bar
with additional guidance in applying the rule.
I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IS A COMMON-LAW
STANDARD OF LIABILITY
Directors owe a fiduciary duty to corporations and their
shareholders.26 This fiduciary duty is commonly evaluated using two
standards of conduct: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.27 Courts
24. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-44 (Wash. 1989).
25. See Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 632, 934 P.2d 669, 681 (1997); In re Spokane Concrete
Prods., Inc., 126 Wash. 2d 269, 279, 892 P.2d 98, 104 (1995).
26. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (establishing that directors serve as
fiduciaries with "powers in trust").
27. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 438 (1993).
Vol. 80:977, 2005
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can impose liability on directors if they fail to perform a corporate duty
in accordance with these standards of conduct. 8 However, when the
corporate duty involves a business decision, courts commonly review
such decision-making under the business judgment rule. 29 The business
judgment rule operates to insulate directors from personal liability
associated with business decisions.3 °
A. Corporate Law Differentiates Between Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Liability
In order to understand judicial review of a director's action, it is
necessary to distinguish between standards of conduct and standards of
liability.3' In general, a standard of conduct sets forth the manner in
which an actor should perform a given activity.32  A standard of
liability, 33 in contrast, establishes the test a court should apply when it
reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability.34 In
most areas of law, these two standards converge.35 For instance, the
standard of conduct governing automobile drivers demands that they
drive with requisite care.36 The standard of liability in a claim against a
driver is whether the driver drove carefully.37
In the corporate context, however, standards of conduct differ from
standards of liability. 8 Standards of conduct are primarily intended for
28. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 annot. at 8-39 (2002).
29. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Centex, 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) ("Application of the [business
judgment] rule... depends upon a showing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business
judgment authorizing the transaction under review."); see also CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 2, § 4.01(c) (indicating that the business judgment rule applies only if a director makes a
"business judgment").
30. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989)
("[T]he business judgment rule ... protect[s] the directors and the decisions they make.").
31. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-58 (differentiating between standards of
conduct and standards of liability in its discussion of the judicial review of director actions).
32. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 437.
33. The terms "standard of liability" and "standard of review" are used interchangeably in the
corporate context. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-58 (referring to Eisenberg's
article, supra note 27, as an analysis of how and why standards of conduct and standards of liability
diverge in corporate law, even though Eisenberg actually used the term standard of review).




38. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-58.
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the actor.3 9 They are legal rules intended to guide a director's behavior.4°
A director who actively conforms to a standard of conduct can be sure of
a safe harbor from liability.41 Failure to comply with a standard of
conduct, on the other hand, does not necessarily lead to liability. 4 The
duty of care and the duty of loyalty are the two most notable concepts of
corporate law that involve standards of conduct.43
In contrast, standards of liability are directed primarily to the judge."
If a judge determines that a director failed a particular standard of
liability, liability is generally axiomatic.45 The business judgment rule is
a standard of liability.46
B. Director Duties Are Commonly Governed by Two Standards of
Conduct: The Duty of Loyalty and the Duty of Due Care
Directors are fiduciaries who hold positions of trust and confidence.47
A corporate director can be liable to a corporation if he or she does not
exercise care to avoid harm to the corporation.48 Directors must also
typically avoid conflicts of interest, and must place a corporation's well-
being ahead of their own.4 9 The primary objective of a director is to
enhance corporate profit and shareholder gains by any legal means
necessary.5
The duty of loyalty is the standard of conduct that applies to directors
to ensure that their self-interest will not interfere with the corporation's
best interests. 51 This standard of conduct requires directors to
39. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 465-66.
40. See id. at 464.
41. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-54.
42. Id.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 438.
44. See id. at 466.
45. See id. at 437, 466.
46. See id. at 438.
47. See, e.g., KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, § 4.01 (stating that directors "must absolutely
refrain from doing any act that breaches their obligation of trust and, in addition, must affirmatively
defend and protect the interests entrusted to them").
48. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981) (ruling that a director
had a duty to prevent her sons from harming the corporation).
49. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2002); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985) (indicating that the obligations of a director do "not tolerate faithlessness or self-
dealing").
50. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 2.01(a).
51. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 450.
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demonstrate the utmost good faith in pursuing the interests of their
companies, and to exert all reasonable and lawful efforts to avoid injury
to the company.52 Any conduct implicating an interest that is adverse to
the corporation will come under close scrutiny, and potentially lead to
liability, unless the conduct is shown to be "fair" to the corporation.
53
The duty of care standard of conduct addresses the attentiveness and
prudence of directors in performing several distinct functions. 54
Although the exact standard of conduct varies depending on the
jurisdiction, the duty of care standard generally requires that directors
perform their functions in good faith, in a manner that they reasonably
believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with care that
an ordinarily prudent person would be expected to exercise under similar
circumstances. 55 Notably, directors are not necessarily liable if their
business decisions conflict with the duty of care standard.
56
C. The Business Judgment Rule Is a Standard of Liability that
Insulates Directors from Liability Based on Their Business
Decisions
The business judgment rule is a procedural barrier that protects a
director's decision unless there is evidence of: (1) bad faith; (2) self-
interest in the transaction; (3) gross negligence in becoming informed; or
(4) lack of subjective belief that the decision was in the best interest of
the corporation. 57 In determining director liability, courts generally will
not second-guess the quality of directors' business decisions, but instead
will focus on the procedures followed in reaching those decisions.
58
52. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, § 4.01.
53. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-.63; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
361 (Del. 1993).
54. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01 (a).
55. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(a).
56. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-54 ("[T]he fact that a director's performance
fails [to meet the duty of care standards] does not automatically establish personal liability for
damages .... ).
57. See id. § 8.31; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.0 1(c).
58. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Courts do not measure, weigh or
quantify directors' judgments.... Due care in the decision-making context is process due care
only.") (emphasis in original); see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a
decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or
'irrational', provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process
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Furthermore, adequately informed directors will rarely be liable for
honest mistakes, even if the director's decision constituted negligence. 59
1. The Business Judgment Rule Is a Procedural Barrier that Applies
to Director Decisions
The business judgment rule establishes certain procedural barriers for
plaintiffs.6 ° Specifically, the initial burden of pleading and the ultimate
burden of persuasion are placed on the challenger to prove the
inapplicability of the business judgment rule.61 This burden is
particularly demanding because courts presume that a director's
decision-making satisfied all applicable legal requirements.62 Put another
way, a plaintiff attempting to impose liability on a director for an unwise
business decision must rebut a "presumption of regularity" in favor of
the director.63
The business judgment rule is a common-law standard of liability that
applies to a director's conscious decision to take or not take action, as
opposed to situations where a director is passive in his or her duties. 64
Courts do not use the business judgment rule to evaluate the majority of
everyday director functions, such as the duties of oversight or inquiry.65
Instead, the rule offers directors protection from personal liability arising
from conscious business decisions.66 Most business judgment cases deal
with risky economic decisions, although the rule extends to such matters
as compensation and the removal of personnel.67
employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.")
(emphasis in original).
59. See BERGER ET AL., supra note 5, § 1031 ("[T]he business judgment rule ... generally
insulates [directors] from negligence liability.").
60. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-55; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) ("The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the
presumption [of regularity].").
61. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-55.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c) cmt. c.
65. Id.
66. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31, annot. at 8-55 (stating that the business judgment rule
"shield[s] the director's decision-making from liability").
67. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c) cmt. b.
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2. The Business Judgment Rule Does Not Apply if a Director Fails to
Comply with the Duty of Loyalty Standard of Conduct
When a person challenging a business decision shows that a director
had self-interest in the decision at issue, the burden of proof shifts to the
director and the business judgment rule no longer applies. 68 Directors
thus cannot appear on both sides of a transaction and expect protection
from the rule.69 Rather, in such cases, directors must show that their
decisions brought forth "fair" results.
70
Some jurisdictions have developed so-called safe harbor provisions in
their duty of loyalty statutes that allow business decisions to be protected
even in conflict-of-interest cases. 71 These provisions, which are typically
based on sections 8.61 through 8.63 of the MBCA, provide insulation
for a director's conflict-of-interest transaction72 if: (1) the transaction is
approved by a majority of the board's disinterested directors73 or its
qualified shareholders; and (2) the conflicted director gave full
disclosure of all material facts to the corporation.74 Thus, a director's
business decision may be protected even though the business judgment
rule does not apply.75
3. The Business Judgment Rule Typically Protects Directors Even
When They Fail to Comply with the Ordinary Duty of Care
Standard of Conduct
Courts separate review of a business decision under the business
68. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.3 1(a)(1) & annot. at 8-59 to -60.
69. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c)(1); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("From the standpoint of interest, this means that directors can neither
appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in
the sense of self-dealing .... ").
70. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (stating that a
director's breach of the duty of loyalty "rebuts the presumption that the directors have acted in the
best interests of the shareholders, and requires the directors to prove that the transaction was entirely
fair").
71. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23B.08.700-.730 (2004) (establishing a safe harbor for
conflict-of-interest transactions made by directors in Washington state).
72. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60 (defining a director's conflict of interest).
73. Approval by the majority of a duly empowered committee of the board is also allowed.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.62(a).
74. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23B.08.700-.730 (mirroring MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§§ 8.61-63).
75. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.3 1(a)(1).
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judgment rule into two distinct parts.7 6 The first part deals with the
director's decision-making process. 77 The court reviews the decision-
making process to determine whether the director became adequately
informed before making a decision.78 The second part focuses on the
director's actual decision.79 Under the second part, courts review the
substance or quality of a decision to determine liability. 80
The business judgment rule often shields directors even when they do
not exercise ordinary due care in becoming informed.8' Although
directors are expected to exercise some level of care in informing
themselves of all material information prior to making the decision,82 the
due care standard is not that of an ordinarily prudent person.83 Rather,
the standard of liability commonly used under the business judgment
rule to review the director's effort in becoming informed is "gross
negligence., 84 The term "gross negligence" is not part of the MBCA.85
Nonetheless, the American Bar Association (ABA) has developed a
similar standard, which respects a director's decision-making process
unless the "preparation to make an informed judgment is so
unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of sound
discretion., 86 Thus, a director may fail to comply with the ordinarily
prudent person standard of conduct when becoming informed, but still
avoid liability under the business judgment rule.87
The business judgment rule also often protects directors even when
76. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(A)-(B); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
2, § 4.01 (c)(2)-(3).
77. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (a)(2)(ii)(B).
78. See id.
79. See id. § 8.31 (a)(2)(ii)(A).
80. See id.
81. See id. § 8.31 annot. at 8-63 to -64.
82. See id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c)(2); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
83. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-61 ("An 'ordinarily prudent person' might do more
to become better informed, but if a director believes, in good faith, that the director can make a
sufficiently informed business judgment, the director will be protected so long as that belief is
within the bounds of reason.").
84. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding that director liability is
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence under the business judgment rule). Gross negligence
is a "high standard" that requires proof of reckless indifference. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note
4, § 2.07.
85. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30-.3 1.




they are grossly negligent in making an actual decision.88 That is, the
gross negligence standard associated with becoming informed is usually
not the standard courts use to review the substance or quality of an
actual directorial decision under the business judgment rule.89 Indeed,
the standard of conduct required in this context is even less demanding.
90
Many leading corporate courts have indicated that the business judgment
rule protects an imprudent decision so long as the decision was
informed. 91 Similarly, the MBCA suggests that a director must only
subjectively believe that the actual decision is in the best interests of the
corporation. 92 The MBCA requires that courts apply an objective belief
standard only in "rare cases" when a decision is "so removed from the
realm of reason.., as to fall outside the permissible bounds of sound
discretion.,
93
In sum, the business judgment rule is a judicial standard of liability
that generally protects disinterested directors from claims of negligent
decision-making. Whether a director complied with a jurisdiction's
ordinary due-care standard of conduct is not dispositive when a plaintiff
attempts to impose liability on that director for a business decision. A
director may avoid liability even if he or she is negligent in becoming
informed or makes a decision that is substantively imprudent. The
business judgment rule only fails to shield a director from liability when
a decision is made: (1) in bad faith; (2) with self-interest; (3) after acting
with gross negligence in becoming informed; or (4) where the director
did not reasonably believe the challenged decision to be in the best
interests of the corporation.
II. THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE HAS
ADDRESSED THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
In the span of nine years, the Washington State Legislature enacted
two statutes that define the general standards of conduct for directors.
94




92. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-63 to -64.
93. See id. § 8.31 annot. at 8-64.
94. See Business Corporation Act, ch. 165, § 97, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 640, 688-89 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (1990)); Act of March 10, 1980, ch. 99, § 5, 1980 Wash. Sess.
Laws 307, 314 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343 (1981) (repealed 1989)).
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The first statute, RCW 23A.08.343, did not address the business
judgment rule. 95 The Legislature's silence on the business judgment rule
ended ten years later when it replaced RCW 23A.08.343 with RCW
23B.08.300.96 RCW 23B.08.300 includes extensive legislative
comments that: (1) discuss whether RCW 23B.08.300 can be used to
impose liability on directors; (2) explain the interplay between RCW
23B.08.300 and the business judgment rule; and (3) set forth guidelines
in applying both.97 These comments are significant because on its face
RCW 23B.08.300 presents ambiguities, and courts may review
legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutes. 98
A. The Washington Legislature Enacted RCW 23A. 08.343 to Clarify
Director Responsibilities, but Did Not Address the Business
Judgment Rule
In 1979, the Washington State Bar Association directed its Section on
Corporation, Business, and Banking Law to review the Washington
Business Corporation Act (RCW Title 23A) for possible changes in light
of revisions made to the MBCA in 1974. 9 This review resulted in the
Legislature's enactment of RCW 23A.08.343 in 1980,00 which reflected
the ABA's 1974 Amendment to section 35 of the MBCA 10 RCW
23A.08.343 provided that:
A director shall perform the duties of a director, including the
duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which
the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner such director
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances. 0 2
95. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343 (1981) (repealed 1989); see also FORTY-SIXTH
LEGISLATURE OF WASH. STATE, FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 67 (1980).
96. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-44 (Wash. 1989).
97. See id.
98. See Dep't of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wash. 2d 454, 458-59, 645 P.2d 1076,
1078 (1982) (stating that courts may review legislative history if the legislature's intent is not clear
from the face of the statute).
99. See FORTY-SIXTH LEGISLATURE OF WASH. STATE, supra note 95, at 67.
100. Act of March 10, 1980, ch. 99, § 5, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 314.
101. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343 (1981) (repealed 1989), with MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 35 (Supp. 1979).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343.
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This broad and ambiguous text prompted three principle issues
amongst scholars, practitioners, and commentators. 10 3 First, the statute
did not indicate whether it represented a standard of liability or a
standard of conduct. 10 4 Second, the statute failed to specify whether it
applied to director decisions, thus leaving unanswered the question of
whether it preempted Washington state's common-law development of
the business judgment rule. 10 5 Finally, RCW 23A.08.343 did not define
the "ordinarily prudent person" standard and its relationship, -if any, with
the law of torts established in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'
0 6
The brief legislative history accompanying RCW 23A.08.343 did
little to clarify these issues. 0 7 This history discussed the baseline
authority of directors to oversee and direct corporation actions, but
remained silent on how the statute affected common-law concepts of
corporate governance. 108 Most significantly, the legislative history failed
to mention the business judgment rule.109 This silence left the courts
with little guidance in applying RCW 23A.08.343 in the context of a
director's business decision.1 10
B. The Legislature Subsequently Enacted RCW23B.08.300 with
Extensive Legislative Comments that Offer Substantive Procedural
Guidelines for Applying the Business Judgment Rule
In 1989, the Washington State Legislature substantially revised the
Washington Business Corporation Act to incorporate provisions of the
Revised Model Business Corporations Act (RMBCA). 11 According to
the Legislature, the RMBCA contained "significant improvements" over
the past version in organization, language, and concepts. 12 As part of
these revisions, the Legislature replaced RCW 23A.08.343 with RCW
103. See Balotti & Hinsey, supra note 23, at 40 (discussing the confusion that developed amongst
corporate scholars when the ABA released the 1974 Amendment to section 35 of the MBCA, which
contained text identical to RCW 23A.08.343).
104. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343.
105. See id.
106. See id. § 23A.08.343; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965) (discussing
the "ordinarily prudent man" standard).




111. FIFTY-FIRST LEGISLATURE OF WASH. STATE, FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 249 (1989).
112. Id.
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23B.08.300, entitled "General Standards for Directors."'1 13 The statute
provides in relevant part that:
(1) A director shall discharge the duties of a director, including
duties as member of a committee: (a) In good faith; (b) With the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and (c) In a manner the
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.... (4) A director is not liable for any action taken
as a director, or any failure to take any action, if the director
performed the duties of the director's office in compliance with
this section.
114
The Legislature did not introduce any significant changes to the text
of RCW 23A.08.343 when it enacted RCW 23B.08.300.115 The only
notable change was the addition of subsection (4). 116 Subsection (4)
states that a director is not liable for a directorial action that complies
with RCW 23B.08.300, but does not address whether courts should
impose liability on directors who violate the statute.1 17 Thus, the
Legislature failed to answer previous questions regarding whether RCW
23A.08.343 constituted a standard of liability or a standard of conduct.1 18
Likewise, the Legislature did not indicate in the text of RCW
23B.08.300 whether it governed directorial decisions.119 On its face, the
statute continued to introduce ambiguities. 120
The legislative history of RCW 23B.08.300, however, presented
Washington courts with several new considerations concerning the
business judgment rule. 121 First, the Legislature expressly discussed
whether RCW 23B.08.300 could impose liability on directors. 122 The
113. Business Corporation Act, ch. 165, § 97, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 640, 688-89.
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (2004).
115. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (1990), with WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343
(1981).
116. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (1990), with WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343
(1981) (repealed 1989).




121. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-44 (Wash. 1989). This legislative history
is indistinguishable from that included in the RMBCA. Compare REV. MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT.
§ 8.30 annot. at 220-25 (1984), with SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-44 (Wash.
1989).
122. SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-42 (Wash. 1989).
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Legislature provided that RCW 23B.08.300 was a "standard of conduct"
for directors that should not be used to review the "correctness of the
director's decisions." 123 It further discussed the unreasonableness of
"reexamin[ing] [director] decisions with the benefit of hindsight."' 24 The
Legislature concluded its discussion on liability by noting that "a
director is not liable for injury or damage caused by a director's
decision, no matter how unwise or mistaken it may turn out to be, if in
performing the director's duties the director met the requirements of
[RCW 23B.08.300].' 25
Second, the Legislature explained the interplay between RCW
23B.08.300 and state common law regarding development of the
business judgment rule.126 The Legislature acknowledged the similarities
between RCW 23B.08.300's text and the business judgment rule.
127
However, the Legislature stated that despite the similarities, they did not
intend to codify the business judgment rule:1
28
The elements of the business judgment rule and the
circumstances for its application are continuing to be developed
by the courts in Washington and elsewhere.... In view of that
continuing judicial development, Proposed section [RCW
23B.08.300] does not try to codify the business judgment rule or
delineate the differences, if any, between that rule and the
standards of director conduct set forth in this section. 1
29
Finally, the Legislature established some procedural guidelines for
applying RCW 23B.08.300 and the business judgment rule. 130 More
pointedly, the comments indicate when courts should apply RCW
23B.08.300 and the business judgment rule in reviewing a business
decision, and how a trier of fact should use each standard to determine
director liability:
If compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in Proposed
section [23B.08.300] is established, there is no need to consider
possible application of the business judgment rule. The possible
123. Id.






130. Id. at 3044.
Washington Law Review
application of the business judgment rule need only be
considered if compliance with the standard of conduct set forth
in Proposed section [23B.08.300] is not established. 131
RCW 23B.08.300's legislative comments are significant because
Washington courts have long turned to legislative history to interpret
ambiguous statutes.132 This rule of statutory construction continues to
govern the review of statues today.133 A court's primary objective in
examining a statute is to determine whether it can ascertain the plain
meaning from the statute on its face. 134 If the plain meaning is
ambiguous-that is, susceptible to two or more reasonable
meanings 135-courts may examine other statutory provisions in the act to
assist in determining the legislative intent.' 36 If the statute remains
ambiguous after such review, it is appropriate to resort to construction
aides, including legislative history.' 37
In sum, the Washington State Legislature answered many significant
questions when it enacted RCW 23B.08.300 with extensive legislative
comments. Specifically, the Legislature established the extent to which
the statute imposes liability on directors, set forth the statute's interplay
with the business judgment rule, and provided guidance in applying both
the statute and the business judgment rule. This legislative history is
important because Washington courts can utilize the comments to
interpret ambiguous statutes.
III. WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE INCONSISTENTLY
APPLIED THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Washington courts have struggled with establishing a consistent
application of the business judgment rule. 138 Although lower courts
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wash. 2d 454, 458-59, 645 P.2d
1076, 1078-79 (1982) (indicating that legislative history may be reviewed to determine legislative
intent when faced with an ambiguous statute).
133. See, e.g., Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9-10,43 P.3d 4,
9 (2002) (providing the same rule of statutory construction established twenty years earlier by the
State Employees' Ins. Bd. court).
134. Id.
135. Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. State Boundary Review Bd. for King County, 127
Wash. 2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953, 959 (1995).
136. See Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wash. 2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230, 1234 (2005).
137. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 12,43 P.3d at 11.
138. See Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 827, 833, 786 P.2d 285, 289 (1990) (indicating
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resolved some inconsistencies during the first fifteen years of the rule's
application, 139 the Washington State Supreme Court has twice, in dicta,
reintroduced confusion into this area of law. 140 As a result, the
application of Washington state's business judgment rule remains
unclear. 141
A. Lower Courts in Washington Have Struggled to Consistently Apply
the Business Judgment Rule
Washington courts first discussed the business judgment rule in
Nursing Home Building Corp. v. DeHart.142 In this case, the plaintiff
corporation alleged that the defendants had fraudulently misappropriated
corporate assets, including management fees, leased automobiles, and
miscellaneous fringe benefits.1 43 The plaintiff attacked such expenditures
as a waste of corporate assets.144
The Nursing Home court relied on the business judgment rule in
ruling against liability. 145 The court employed a statement from William
Fletcher's treatise on corporate law to define the business judgment
rule. 146 This statement indicated that directors should be given "wide
latitude" in making decisions and should not be held liable for mistakes
of judgment if they acted with honesty and good faith. 147 It further
supported judicial restraint even when a director's actual decision
involved a gross error in judgment. 148 Thus, because the defendants
acted without a corrupt motive and in good faith, the court held that they
were immune from liability under the business judgment rule. 14 9 The
Nursing Home court established that there could be instances in which
directors might be completely incompetent in becoming informed about
that application of the business judgment rule is uncertain in Washington state).
139. See infra Part ILA-.B.
140. See Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 631, 934 P.2d 669, 680 (1997); In re Spokane
Concrete Prods., Inc., 126 Wash. 2d 269, 279, 892 P.2d 98, 104 (1995).
141. See infra Part III.C.
142. 13 Wash. App. 489, 535 P.2d 137 (1975).
143. Id. at 498, 535 P.2d at 143.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 498-500, 535 P.2d at 143-44.
146. Id. at 498-99, 535 P.2d at 143-44 (citing WILLIAM FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 1039, at 621-25 (perm. ed. 1974)).
147. Id. at 499, 535 P.2d at 144 (citing FLETCHER, supra note 146, § 1039, at 621-25).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 499-500, 535 P.2d at 144-45.
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a decision, yet retain the affirmative defense of the business judgment
rule. 150 Put another way, a director's sole obligation when making a
business decision was to act in "good faith."15' The court did not address
procedural aspects of the business judgment rule.152
Shortly after Nursing Home, the Legislature enacted RCW
23A.08.343. 53 Washington courts first applied the new statute in
Schwarzmann v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners. 1'4 That case dealt with a
condominium board of directors that refused to perform maintenance
work on the plaintiffs unit.' 55 The Schwarzmann court cited Nursing
Home and the "good faith" standard with approval. 156 However, the
court then stated that RCW 23A.08.343 codified the business judgment
rule.' 7 This interpretation presented a logical inconsistency because if
RCW 23A.08.343 truly codified the business judgment rule, then a
director needed to act with more than good faith in order to avoid
liability: a showing of ordinary due care would also be required. 158 The
court nevertheless relied on Nursing Home, ruling that the board
members did not breach the duty because they acted in good faith. 5 9
In Seafirst Corp. v. Jenkins,160 a federal district court, applying
Washington law, attempted to resolve the confusion in Schwarzmann.
161
The plaintiff claimed that the corporation's board failed to implement
proper oversight procedures.' 62 Despite the fact that the director did not
make a definitive business decision, the court applied the business
150. See id. at 499, 535 P.2d at 144.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Act of March 13, 1980, ch. 99, § 5, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws 307, 314 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 23A.08.343 (1981) (repealed 1989)).
154. 33 Wash. App. 397, 655 P.2d 1177 (1982).
155. Id. at 399-400, 655 P.2d at 1179.
156. Id. at401-02, 655 P.2d at 1180.
157. Id. at 402 n.1, 655 P.2d at 1180 n.1.
158. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.343 (stating that a director must perform duties of a
director "in good faith... and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances") (emphasis added).
159. See Schwarzmann, 33 Wash. App. at 403, 655 P.2d at 1181 (holding that there was "no
evidence of bad faith or improper motive which would demonstrate that the board members
breached a duty owed to the plaintiffs").
160. 644 F. Supp. 1152 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
161. See id. at 1158-59.
162. See id. at 1158.
Vol. 80:977, 2005
Risky Business
judgment rule to review the director's actions.' 63 The court then rejected
the notion that the business judgment rule shielded any director decision
made in good faith, instead asserting that evidence of ordinary due care
was necessary due to RCW 23A.08.343.164 The court concluded that the
determination of whether the directors exercised ordinary care was a
question of fact for the jury.1 65 In short, the court treated the ordinary-
care standard. as a standard of liability for directors, and dismissed the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 166
B. The Shinn Court Resolved Some Previous Inconsistencies
Associated with the Business Judgment Rule
In Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 67 Division I of the Washington State
Court of Appeals faced possible application of the business judgment
rule in a case that stemmed from a breach-of-partnership claim. 68 The
Shinn court first recognized that the scope of Washington's business
judgment rule was unclear.169 Then, after analyzing Nursing Home,
Schwarzmann, and Seafirst, the court indicated that the Seafirst court's
application of the business judgment rule was most in line with excerpts
of Fletcher's treatise that required a director to act both in good faith and
with "proper care, skill, and diligence.' 170 However, in contrast to the
Seafirst court's ruling, the court indicated that the duty-of-care standards
in RCW 23A.08.343 did not appear to codify the business judgment
rule. 171 Thus, even though a director was required to exercise some level
of care, the court suggested that courts should not use the ordinary due
care standard in RCW 23A.08.343 to define that level of care.1
72
163. See id. at 1154. Washington courts have since realized that the business judgment rule does
not apply to cases where no business decision is made. See Scott v. Trans-Sys., Inc., 148 Wash. 2d
701, 709, 64 P.3d 1, 5 (2003) (stating that the business judgment rule applies to "decision[s] to
undertake [a] transaction") (emphasis added); Sem v. Nw. Underwriters, Inc., 74 Wash. App. 408,
414-15, 875 P.2d 637, 640 (1994) (applying a duty of oversight standard of care, instead of the
business judgment rule, in its review of a director's inattentiveness).
164. Seafirst, 644 F. Supp. at 1159.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. 56 Wash. App. 827, 786 P.2d 285 (1990).
168. Id. at 833, 786 P.2d at 289.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 833-35, 786 P.2d at 289-90.
171. See id. at 834 n.1, 786 P.2d at 290 n.1.
172. See id. at 833-35, 786 P.2d at 290.
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The Shinn court ultimately avoided ruling on whether the business
judgment rule applied to partnerships.1 73 Nonetheless, it provided helpful
clarifications regarding the rule's application.1 74 Specifically, the court
stated that the business judgment rule required a director to exercise
proper care, in addition to showing good faith, when making a business
decision. 75 Although the court never defined the exact standard of care
to be applied, 76 it suggested that the standard did not come from RCW
23A.08.343. 77 In addition, the court continued to cite Fletcher's
statement of the business judgment rule with approval, thus accepting
the treatise's claim that the rule should protect a director's good faith
and informed decision-making even if it represents a gross error in
judgment.178 Therefore, while a director was required to exercise some
undefined level of care in becoming informed, courts would apply a less
demanding gross-error standard when reviewing the actual decision. 79
C. In Dicta, the Washington State Supreme Court Has Suggested that
Compliance with RCW 23B. 08.300 Is a Necessary Part of the
Business Judgment Rule Standard of Liability
The Washington State Supreme Court first addressed the business
judgment rule by way of dicta in Spokane Concrete Products, Inc. v.
U.S. Bank.180 There, the court briefly discussed the business judgment
rule and the recently enacted RCW 23B.08.300 as they related to the
controlling shareholders' decision to commence a leveraged buyout.181
In its discussion of the business judgment rule, the court indicated that it
reviewed business decisions under the rule unless there was evidence of
"fraud, dishonesty, or incompetence."182  The court equated
incompetence with a directors' failure to exercise proper care. 183 Then, it
173. See id. at 837, 786 P.2d at 291.
174. See id. at 833-35,786 P.2d at 289-90.
175. Id. at 834-35, 786 P.2d at 289-90.
176. Note that neither the Shinn court, nor any lower court, has addressed procedural guidelines
associated with the business judgment rule. See generally Shinn, 56 Wash. App. 827, 786 P.2d 285.
177. See id. at 834-35, 786 P.2d at 289-90.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. 126 Wash. 2d 269, 892 P.2d 98 (1995).
181. See id. at 278-80, 892 P.2d at 103-04.




suggested that (1) the concept of proper care in the context of the
business judgment rule was defined in RCW 23B.08.300, and (2) the
business judgment rule would only apply if a director complied with the
statute.184 Therefore, a director could not take a risk, whether associated
with the decision-making process or the actual decision, without being
exposed to liability, unless he or she complied with RCW 23B.08.300.'85
In essence, the court's dicta seemed to establish that the business
judgment rule and RCW 23B.08.300 were one and the same. 186 The
court never addressed the statute's extensive legislative history.1
87
The court indirectly revisited the business judgment rule two years
later in Riss v. Angel.'88 In Riss, plaintiff lot owners brought suit against
a homeowners association for the association's rejection of proposed
building plans. 189 In analyzing the liability of each individual
homeowner in the association, the court discussed the business judgment
rule without ultimately ruling as to whether it applied to homeowners
associations. 190 The court focused its analysis on the Schwarzmann
good-faith standard.)91 However, the court concluded its discussion by
noting that a director was required to abide by the ordinarily prudent
person standards of RCW 23B.08.300 as part of the business judgment
rule standard of liability.' 92 Again, the court did not discuss the statute's
legislative history. 93 In addition, the court continued to avoid any
discussion regarding procedural guidelines associated with the business
judgment rule. 194
In the recent case of Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 95 however, the
Washington State Supreme Court, in dicta, appeared to abandon its
184. See id. ("[D]irectors may take risks... so long as they comply with RCW 23B.08.300(l)."




188. 131 Wash. 2d 612, 934 P.2d 669 (1997).
189. Id. at 619, 934 P.2d at 674.
190. Id. at 631-33, 934 P.2d at 680-81.
191. Id. at 631-32, 934 P.2d at 680-81.
192. See id. at 633, 934 P.2d at 681 (stating that "a director must also act with such care as a




195. 148 Wash. 2d 701, 64 P.3d 1 (2003).
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previous duty-of-care discussion altogether. 196 In an action to dissolve a
corporation for oppression of the minority shareholder, the court referred
to the previously criticized good-faith standard that was set forth in
Nursing Home: "Under the 'business judgment rule,' corporate
management is immunized from liability in a corporate transaction
where... there is a reasonable basis to indicate that the transaction was
made in good faith."'1 97 In contrast to Riss, there was no discussion of the
ordinarily prudent care standard. 198 Rather, the court simply ended the
brief discussion of the business judgment rule by noting that courts are
reluctant to interfere with business judgments.1 99
In sum, Washington courts have not established a consistent
application of the business judgment rule. Although the Washington
State Supreme Court has not formally ruled on the subject, previous
dicta, with the exception of that in Scott, suggests a business judgment
rule standard of liability that requires adherence to the ordinarily prudent
person standard of RCW 23B.08.300. Importantly, this requirement
appears to extend to both a director's process of becoming informed and
the quality or substance of a director's decision. The Court seemingly
reached these conclusions without addressing the extensive legislative
history of RCW 23B.08.300.
IV. THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN RCW 23B.08.300 ARE
NOT ELEMENTS OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Washington state courts should not incorporate the standards of
conduct of RCW 23B.08.300 into the business judgment rule standard of
liability. The statute is sufficiently ambiguous to justify reference to its
legislative history.200 This history establishes a division between the
general standard of conduct for directors in discharging duties set forth
in RCW 23B.08.300, and the business judgment rule standard of liability
that applies to directors' decisions.20' Specifically, the legislative history
196. See id. at 709, 64 P.3d at 5. A recent Washington State Court of Appeals decision discussing
the business judgment rule also did not address duty of care standards. See generally Northview
Terrace Ass'n v. Mueller, 111 Wash. App. 1002, No. 27111-7-11, 2002 WL 598523 (Wash. App.
Apr. 5, 2002) (omitting any reference to the duty of care in its discussion of the business judgment
rule).
197. Scott, 148 Wash. 2d at 709, 64 P.3d at 5.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
201. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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confirms that the Legislature did not intend to modify the business
judgment rule previously applied by lower courts in Washington. °2 The
removal of RCW 23B.08.300 from the business-judgment-rule standard
of liability leaves a three-step process for reviewing business
judgments.2 °3 In general, the business judgment rule in Washington
should shield directors from liability when the director: (1) makes a
conscious business decision; (2) acts in good faith; and (3) becomes
competently informed.20 4
A. The Ambiguity ofRCW23B.08.300 Allows Courts to Review Its
Legislative History, Which Separates Ordinary Due Care
Standards from the Business Judgment Rule
The legislative history of RCW 23B.08.300 indicates that the statute
is not a standard of liability, but instead a standard of conduct that courts
should not use to impose liability on a director under the business
judgment rule for an unwise business decision.20 5 It is proper to review
the legislative history because there are two basic ambiguities within
RCW 23B.08.300(l). 20 6 First, it is unclear whether the provision should
207
be used as a standard of conduct or a standard of liability for directors.
Second, it is ambiguous whether the statute governs a director's business
decision, or alternatively, whether it applies to director duties that do not
involve decisions (e.g., duty of oversight). 0 8 Therefore, Washington
state courts should examine the legislative history to determine the
Legislature's intent.209 This history provides that RCW 23B.08.300 is a
standard of conduct separate and distinct from the business judgment
202. See infra Part IV.A.3.
203. See infra Part IV.B.
204. The MBCA includes a four-step process in reviewing business decisions. See supra Part I.C.
In addition to becoming adequately informed, the fourth step requires that the director reasonably
(the term "rationally" is used by the American Law Institute) believes that the decision was in the
best interest of the corporation. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (2002). This belief is generally the
director's subjective belief, unless the decision reaches the level of absurdity. See id. § 8.31 annot. at
8-63 to -64. Washington state courts have not adopted this fourth step. However, this Comment
recommends such action in Part V.
205. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-44 (Wash. 1989).
206. See Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4, 10
(2002) (stating that if a statute is ambiguous, "it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction,
including legislative history").
207. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300(4) (2004).
208. See id. § 23B.08.300(l).
209. See Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wash. 2d 129, 134, 830 P.2d 350, 352-53 (1992).
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rule.21 o
1. RCW23B.08.300 Is Ambiguous as to Whether It Should Be Used
as a Standard for Director Liability
RCW 23B.08.300 does not indicate whether a director can be liable
for failing to meet the statute's standard of ordinary due care. The title of
RCW 23B.08.300, "General standards for directors," implies that the
statute invokes a standard of conduct, not a standard of liability.2 1 1
However, other sections of RCW 23B.08.300 suggest that the statute
imposes liability on directors who do not comply with the section. 21 2 For
example, RCW 23B.08.300(1) indicates that a director "shall discharge
the duties of a director... [w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. 2 13
Concepts of due "care" and the "ordinarily prudent person" stem from
tort law.214 In tort law, failure to comply with the duty of care by acting
as an ordinarily prudent person constitutes negligence.21 5 Individuals are
liable for the damage they cause while negligent.21 6 This suggests that
violation of the standard in RCW 23B.08.300 will lead to liability.2 17
RCW 23B.08.300(4) introduces additional ambiguity as to whether
the statute imposes director liability.2 18 This subsection indicates that
"[a] director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure
to take action, if the director performed the duties of the director's office
in compliance with this section. 2' 9 This implies that a director will be
liable if he or she does not comply with the section. However, this
210. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041-44 (Wash. 1989).
211. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300; see also supra Part L.A (discussing the difference
between standards of conduct and standards of liability in the corporate context).
212. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300(1), (4).
213. Id. § 23B.08.300(l)(b) (emphasis added).
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965).
215. Id. § 283.
216. Id. § 430.
217. See Balotti & Hinsey, supra note 23, at 40. The ABA acknowledged and dismissed this
misunderstanding in its 1998 amendments to the MBCA. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot.
at 8-54. The ABA noted that "[t]he employment of the concept of 'care,' if considered in the
abstract, suggests a tort-law/negligence-based analysis looking toward a finding of fault and damage
recovery where the duty of care has not been properly observed and loss has been suffered[, b]ut the
Model Act's desired level of director performance... does not carry with it the same type of result-
oriented liability analysis." Id.
218. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23B.08.300(4).




interpretation does not come from the plain meaning of the statute, as it
requires a negative inference.22° Indeed, just because compliance with
the statutory standard precludes liability does not mean that a lack of
compliance will result in liability.221 Additional requirements besides the
lack of compliance may be necessary to impose liability.222 The result is
an ambiguity that brings forth two reasonable meanings. Therefore, the
statute's meaning should be determined from the legislative history.223
2. RCW 23B. 08.300 Is Ambiguous as to Whether It Applies to
Director Decisions
RCW 23B.08.300(1) does not plainly specify whether it constitutes a
standard governing directors' business decisions.224 Rather, the section
simply provides that it applies to a director in the discharge of his or her
duties. 225 Neither RCW 23B.08.300, nor any other provision within Title
23B, provides any indication as to what actions constitute the discharge
of a directorial duty.226 In the corporate context, however, the directors'
duties and decisions are commonly reviewed separately. 227 For example,
the current version of the MBCA provides two distinct provisions related
,,228
to director actions: one that governs "discharging... duties, and one
220. See id; see also Balotti & Hinsey, supra note 23, at 40 (stating that the 1974 Amendment to
section 35 of the MBCA, which closely resembles RCW 23B.08.300, "seemed to imply by way of
negative inference that a director who did not so perform[] his duties could be held liable") (internal
quotations omitted).
221. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300(4) (stating that "[a] director is not liable for any action
taken" in accordance with a statute, but not stating that a director is liable should he or she fail to
comply).
222. See supra Part L.A (discussing the common occurrence in corporate law of providing
standards of conduct that guide conduct, but do not produce liability).
223. See State Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4, 10
(2002); see also supra Part II.B (explaining when it is proper to review legislative history in
Washington state).
224. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300(l).
225. See id.
226. See id. § 23B.01.400 (lacking a definition for director duty); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.08.010(3) (stating that "[a] corporation may dispense with or limit the authority of its board
of directors by describing in its articles of incorporation who will perform some or all of the duties
of the board of directors," but not providing any direction regarding business decisions).
227. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.01(c) cmt. c (providing two examples of
cases where duty of oversight does not contain a decision: (1) director's failure to read basic
financial information; and (2) not considering the need for a effective audit process).
228. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
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that governs "any [director] decision to take or not to take action. 22g
Likewise, the American Law Institute (ALI) developed section 4.01(a)
of Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations,
which applies to the manner in which a director performs his or her
functions, and section 4.01(c), which applies when a director makes a
decision associated with those functions. 230 Considering that it is unclear
whether or not RCW 23B.08.300 applies to director decisions, it is
appropriate to resort to the extensive legislative history to determine the
meaning.23 '
3. RCW 23B. 08.300's Legislative History Confirms that the Statute Is
a Standard of Conduct that Should Not Be Used to Impose Liability
on a Director for a Business Decision
RCW 23B.08.300's legislative history immediately dismisses the idea
of imposing liability on a director who fails to comply with RCW
23B.08.300 when making a business decision.232 The first sentence of
the official comment states that RCW 23B.08.300 defines the general
standard of conduct for directors.233 This statement supports the
argument that RCW 23B.08.300 is not a standard of liability.3 4 Rather,
RCW 23B.08.300 establishes a safe harbor for directors who conform
their actions to the standards.235 Although the legislative history states
that RCW 23B.08.300 "requires a director to perform" his or her duties
in accordance with RCW 23B.08.300(l), the Legislature preceded this
statement by noting that the statute should not be used to review the
substance of a director's decision.236
The legislative history addresses the standard of liability that should
229. Id. § 8.31(a) (emphasis added).
230. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, §4.01; id., §4.01(a)(l)-(2) & cmt. c
(indicating that courts review the duty of oversight under § 4.01 (c), rather than § 4.01 (a), only when
a director consciously "decide[s] which functions to delegate and what procedures, programs, or
other techniques... they need to help effectuate the oversight function") (emphasis added).
231. See Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4, 10
(2002); Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash. 2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583, 586 (2001).
232. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041 (Wash. 1989).
233. Id.
234. See supra Part I.A. (explaining the difference between a standard of liability and a standard
of conduct in the corporate context).
235. SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3042 (Wash. 1989).




be imposed on directors when they make a business decision.237 This
history emphasizes that the courts must pay deference to director
decisions and must avoid reviewing business judgments with the benefit
of hindsight. 38 The legislative history states that a director may avoid
liability due to an "unwise or mistaken" decision by complying with
RCW 23B.08.300, but it does not declare that a director is liable for
injury or damages caused by a director's decision when he or she fails to
comply with RCW 23B.08.300. 239 Instead, the comments reveal that
courts should use the separate and distinct business judgment rule, which
is currently being developed by the courts in Washington state, to
determine liability.2 40 Thus, the only function of the statute when
reviewing business decisions is to provide a safe harbor for directors in
the event of director compliance. 4'
The Legislature's desire to set forth a clear division between the
business judgment rule and RCW 23B.08.300 extends far beyond its
stated exclusion of business decisions from the statute's scope in the first
two paragraphs of the legislative history. Indeed, the legislative history
expressly states that the section is not a codification of the business
judgment rule. 42 The legislative history later cements this division by
establishing a specific procedure by which the courts should apply RCW
23B.08.300 and the business judgment rule:
If compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in Proposed
section [23B.08.300] is established, there is no need to consider
possible application of the business judgment rule. The possible
application of the business judgment rule need only be
considered if compliance with the standard of conduct set forth
in Proposed section [23B.08.300] is not established. 43
Therefore, the ordinarily prudent person standard of conduct is not
part of the business judgment rule standard of liability.244 In fact,
application of RCW 23B.08.300 occurs before the business judgment





242. Id. (stating that "[p]roposed section [23B.08.300] does not try to codify the business
judgment rule").
243. Id. at 3044.
244. See id. at 3042.
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rule standard of liability should be applied.245 If a director complies with
RCW 23B.08.300, judicial review of the challenged conduct ends.246 In
the event that a director fails to comply with the ordinarily prudent
person standard, a court should then apply the business judgment rule to
determine liability.247
B. Disentangling RCW 23B. 08.300 from the Business Judgment Rule
Leaves a Three-Step Process for Reviewing Business Judgments in
Washington State
The recommended separation of RCW 23B.08.300 from the business
judgment rule standard of liability will resolve the inconsistencies of
past Washington state court rulings, and leave a three-step process for
reviewing business judgments. In Washington, the business judgment
rule will appropriately shield directors from liability when the director:
(1) makes a conscious business decision; (2) acts in good faith; and (3)
avoids acts of incompetence in becoming informed.248 If a director
satisfies these three criteria, Washington courts should not second-guess
the merits of a director's decision even when there is an after-the-fact
showing of gross error in judgment.249
1. To Be Protected by the Business Judgment Rule in Washington, a
Director Must Make a Conscious Business Decision
Application of the business judgment rule hinges on whether a
director in fact made a business decision.250 Absent a challenged
245. Id. at 3044.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. The MBCA includes a four-step process in reviewing business decisions. See infra Part I.C.
This Comment recommends such action in Part V.
249. See Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wash. App. 489, 499, 535 P.2d 137, 144
(1975) ("[T]he law will not hold directors liable... [e]ven though the errors may be so gross that
they may demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate affairs." (quoting
FLETCHER, supra note 146, § 1039, at 621-25)) (emphasis added).
250. Compare Nursing Home, 13 Wash. App. at 498, 535 P.2d at 143 (applying business
judgment rule to review the decision of controlling shareholders to expend corporate assets on
management fees, leased automobiles, and miscellaneous fringe benefits), with Senn v. Nw.
Underwriters, Inc., 74 Wash. App. 408, 416-17, 875 P.2d 637, 641 (1994) (withholding application
of the business judgment rule in a case of oversight that did not include a conscious business
decision). See also Scott v. Trans-Sys., Inc., 148 Wash. 2d 701, 709, 64 P.3d 1, 5 (2002) ("Under
the 'business judgment rule,' corporate management is immunized from liability in a corporate




business decision, courts should apply the general standards of RCW
23B.08.300(1) to review the conduct of the director.25 1 Application of
RCW 23B.08.300 occurs when the individual performs directorial
duties-such as the duty of oversight or inquiry-that do not include
conscious business decisions.252 Directors may not claim protection of
the business judgment rule under such circumstances.253
If a director makes a business decision,254 then he or she satisfies the
first step of the analysis and may be eligible for protection under the
business judgment rule. It is important to note, however, that evidence of
a business decision does not render RCW 23B.08.300 inoperative.
255
Washington courts may review a director's decision against the
standards of conduct in RCW 23B.08.300 to determine whether a claim
should be dismissed.256 That is, if a director's actions are in accordance
with the standards of RCW 23B.08.300, then that director's exoneration
from liability is automatic.25 7 If the director's decision conflicts with
RCW 23B.08.300, then review continues under the business judgment
standard of liability.258
2. Washington State Courts Should Not Allow Application of the
Business Judgment Rule if the Director Did Not Act in Good Faith
Courts in Washington have stated that directors must act in "good
faith" in order for the business judgment rule to apply,259 but have failed
to provide a definitive explanation of that term.260 Lack of good faith,
corporation.") (emphasis added). Washington courts have not yet ruled on whether the business
judgment rule applies to situations where the director consciously decided not to act. However,
most leading corporate law jurisdictions have applied the business judgment rule in cases where the
director consciously decided not to act. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984)
(noting that "[a] conscious decision to refrain from acting may... be a valid exercise of business
judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule").
251. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3042 (Wash. 1989).
252. See Scott, 148 Wash. 2d at 709, 64 P.3d at 5; see also supra Part I.C. I.
253. Scott, 148 Wash. 2d at 709, 64 P.3d at 5; see also supra Part l.C.1.
254. The decision must be undertaken within the power of the corporation and the authority of
management. Scott, 148 Wash. 2d at 709, 64 P.3d at 5.




259. See Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 827, 833-34, 786 P.2d 285, 289 (1990); Seafirst
Corp. v. Jenkins, 644 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
260. See, e.g., Shinn, 56 Wash. App. at 833-34, 786 P.2d at 289 (excluding any substantive
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however, appears to be synonymous with dishonesty.261 Whereas older
opinions such as Schwarzmann and Nursing Home used the term "good
faith,, 262 later cases have noted that a showing of "dishonesty"
eliminates any application of the business judgment rule.263 Regardless
of the term used, in order for the business judgment rule to apply, a
director must honestly believe at the time of the decision that he or she is
acting in the best interests of the corporation.264
When a director's decision involves a conflict of interest,265 the
business judgment rule should no longer afford the director protection
because courts cannot presume that the director made the decision in
good faith.266 Although the business judgment rule should not be used to
protect business decisions made with self-interest, a director may still be
afforded protection under Washington law.267 Courts should recognize
that RCW 23B.08.710 establishes a safe-harbor provision for directors'
conflict of interest transactions.268 If the particular issue involves a
director's conflicting-interest transaction as defined under RCW
23B.08.700(2), and the director complies with the safe harbor provision
of RCW 23B.08.710, then the court should not impose liability on an
discussion of the good faith requirement in a breach-of-partnership claim); Seafirst, 644 F. Supp. at
1159 (excluding any substantive discussion of the good faith requirement in a claim of
mismanagement against Seafirst Corporation directors).
261. Compare In re Spokane Concrete Prods., Inc., 126 Wash. 2d 269, 279, 892 P.2d 98, 104
(1995) ("Unless there is evidence of fraud, dishonesty, or incompetence ... courts will generally
refuse to substitute their judgment for that of the directors."), with Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v.
DeHart, 13 Wash. App. 489, 499, 535 P.2d 137, 144 (1975) ("[T]he law will not hold directors
liable for honest errors, for mistakes of judgment, when they act without corrupt motive and in good
faith .... (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 146, § 1039, at 621-25)).
262. See Schwarzmann v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 33 Wash. App. 397, 402, 655 P.2d 1177,
1180 (1982); Nursing Home, 13 Wash. App. at 499, 535 P.2d at 144.
263. See Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 632, 934 P.2d 669, 681 (1997) (quoting Spokane
Concrete, 126 Wash. 2d at 279, 892 P.2d 98 at 104).
264. See Nursing Home, 13 Wash. App. at 499, 535 P.2d 137 at 144.
265. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.700(l)-(2) (2004) (providing a definition of what
constitutes a director's conflict of interest).
266. See Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 827, 833-34, 786 P.2d 285, 289-90 (1990), see
also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 annot. at 8-55 (2002) (indicating that the business judgment rule
presumption does not apply to cases involving self-dealing or other breaches of the duty of loyalty).
267. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.710 (providing a safe harbor for director decisions that
involve a conflict of interest).
268. Id. Courts should also recognize that RCW 23B.08.320 provides an additional safe harbor
for directors. This provision allows corporations to limit the personal liability of a director so long
as the corporation does not limit liability of a director for acts of intentional misconduct by a
director. Id. § 23B.08.320.
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interested director due to an unfavorable business decision.269
3. The Business Judgment Rule Should Not Be Applied if There Is a
Showing of Director Incompetence in Becoming Informed About
the Decision
Washington case law provides that the business judgment rule should
not be applied if a director displays "incompetence" in becoming
informed.27 ° In dicta, the Washington State Supreme Court has stated
that the term "incompetence" is related to the concept of "proper care,
skill, and diligence," but has not yet defined these standards. 271 Although
the Court never substantially elaborated on the meaning of these
standards,272 lower courts have suggested that such standards do not
apply to the director's actual decision.273 On the topic of the director's
actual decision, Washington state appellate courts have consistently
enumerated, without reversal, that a director's error "may be so gross
that [it] may demonstrate the unfitness of the director[] to manage the
corporate affairs., 274 Thus, the common-law standard of incompetence
or proper care only applies to the decision-making process, not the
reasonableness or quality of a director's decision. Indeed, gross errors in
judgment will be protected so long as the board exercised proper care in
269. See id. § 23B.08.700; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (a)(1).
270. See Shinn, 56 Wash. App. at 834, 786 P.2d at 290; In re Spokane Concrete Prods., Inc., 126
Wash. 2d 269, 279, 892 P.2d 98, 104 (1995).
271. See Spokane Concrete, 126 Wash. 2d at 279, 892 P.2d at 104 (stating that the business
judgment rule does not apply if "there is evidence of fraud, dishonesty, or incompetence (i.e., failure
to exercise proper care, skill, and diligence)," but never injecting content into the meaning of these
terms).
272. For example, the Riss court advised that reasonable care must be taken by the director. Riss
v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 632, 934 P.2d 669, 681 (1997). However, there was no indication
whether the standard of reasonable care was subjective or objective. See id. Furthermore, the court
did not explain what level of culpability was required for a director's action to be deemed
unreasonable (i.e., ordinary negligence, gross negligence, etc.). See id.
273. See Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wash. App. 489, 499, 535 P.2d 137, 144
(1975) (citing FLETCHER, supra note 146, § 1039, at 621-25, for the proposition that directors
would not be liable for unwise business decisions even if they constituted a gross error in
judgment).
274. See, e.g., Shinn, 56 Wash. App. at 833-34, 786 P.2d at 290 (stating that the sole good-faith
standard of Nursing Home was inaccurate, but not considering the substantive gross-error standard).
Further, in a recent opinion on the subject, the Washington State Court of Appeals again stated that
the business judgment rule applies "even though the errors may be so gross that they may
demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate affairs." Northview Terrace
Ass'n v. Mueller, No. 27111-7-11, 2002 WL 598523, at *5 n.4 (Wash. App. Apr. 5, 2002).
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reaching the decision. The legislative comments of RCW 23B.08.300
support this concept.275 It is also consistent with several leading
corporate law jurisdictions.276
V. CONCLUSION
Washington courts should not apply the standards of conduct in RCW
23B.08.300 to determine liability of a director under the business
judgment rule because the legislature intended the statute to be separate
and distinct from the rule. This assertion is supported by the legislative
history of RCW 23B.08.300, which courts should review due to
ambiguities in the statute. Separating RCW 23B.08.300 from the
business judgment rule leaves a three-step process for reviewing
business decisions. Under this framework, the business judgment rule
protects a director's good faith business decision-even in the event of a
gross error in judgment-so long as the director exercised proper care in
becoming informed. Unfortunately, Washington courts have not yet
defined concepts such as "good faith," "proper care," and "gross error in
judgment." In addition, Washington courts have not established the
rule's procedural guidelines. Therefore, this Comment recommends that
Washington courts utilize the framework developed by outside
authorities on the business judgment rule to provide practitioners,
directors, and the judiciary with additional guidance in applying the rule.
Although several outside sources exist that can supplement
Washington's law, including persuasive precedent from leading
corporate-law jurisdictions like Delaware, Washington courts should
consider adopting section 8.31 of the MBCA for three reasons. First,
section 8.31 would provide the judiciary with substantive rules and an
analytical framework for reviewing the business decisions of directors.
Injection of such content into Washington's business judgment rule
would provide interested parties with an understanding of how and when
the rule applies. Second, section 8.31 would establish an essential fourth
step for reviewing business decisions that Washington law currently
lacks. Specifically, section 8.31 does not allow directors to avoid
liability when they make obviously wasteful decisions just because they
became adequately informed. Rather, it permits the imposition of
liability in those rare cases when a director's actual decision extends
275. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 51-2, Reg. Sess., at 3041 (Wash. 1989) (stating that due care
standards should not be used to review the quality or substance of a director's business decision).




beyond a gross error in judgment to a level of absurdity. Finally,
Washington courts should utilize section 8.31 because the ABA adopted
this section to supplement section 8.30, which is similar to RCW
23B.08.300. Thus, Washington courts can adopt section 8.31 without
conflicting with the current law established in RCW 23B.08.300.
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